The last two months of the life of Todor Aleksandrov were too tense, connected with the taking of important and fateful for the liberation revolutionary movement and for the IMRO (Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organisation) decisions. Thus, on 10 July 1924 Aleksandrov sent a letter to Brezov (Ivan Mihajlov) in Sofia, informing him about the secret mission of "the friend" (Mihail Monev) in Vienna. It became clear that "the friend" was to negotiate there with the representatives of the Commintern Cherski (Goldstein) and other Soviet officials. The latter, Aleksandrov insisted, had to be made not to publish the adopted and signed documents (the May manifesto and the Declaration for the unity of the revolutionary forces) until they were not approved by the congress of IMRO.
A day earlier (on 9 July) Todor Aleksandrov had received from the Austrian capital the ultimatum of Dimitur Vlahov who arrogantly insisted for the publication of the documents in the next 10 days. Otherwise, Vlahov threatened, they would be published in the first issue of his "Federation Balcanique".
On 11 July Todor Aleksandrov continued his efforts for direct talks with the Commintern and Soviet officials in Vienna in order to avert the premature publication of the May manifesto and the accompanying declaration. He sent a new letter to Brezov. In it he expressed satisfaction that Monev already departed for Vienna and that he himself was currently having an "important business" to attend and could not change his location (at that time Aleksandrov staid at the house of Mihail Monev in Gorna Dzhumaja or in the house of the Kjustendil voevoda Angel Uzunov in Kjustendil). He also informed about the possibility to go to the village of Banja and expressed his hope that he will not be discovered by the people of "Serbez" (??). At the same time Aleksandrov worked intensely in order to divert the danger for IMRO coming from the side of the Ilinden organisation and its leaders G. Zankov and Arseni Jovkov. Contrary to the decisions of the Central Committee (CK) of IMRO the latter two were elected as members of the CK (of Ilinden) with the support of the Communists on its Plovdiv congress. This in fact strengthened the already existing in IMRO fraction against Aleksandrov, which included the leaders of the Sjar revolutionary region Aleko Vassilev (Pashata) and of the Strumica revolutionary region Georgi Atanasov. This fraction also had the tacit support of the member of the CK Aleksandur Protogerov. That is why in his correspondence from these days Aleksandrov was interested whether Ivan Mihajlov had already ordered to the leader of the Ilinden organisation Petur Acev and "Zhivko" (Georgi Zankov) that they have to come to talks with him.
On 18 July 1924, in order to exert a pressure over IMRO and in order to compromise the members of the CK, Dimitur Vlahov published the Vienna documents. This sent shock waves in Bulgarian and Europe. The danger of a split and internecine fighting as well as of the involvement of some its leader in the gambles of the Bulgarian Communist Party (the prepared new armed uprising) became a real threat for IMRO. One letter of 5 August 1924 sent by Anto (a pseudonym) to Ivan Mihajlov reveals the picture of these days. Anto's letter has interesting notes of Todor Aleksandrov which shows that it was probably sent to him for information and an opinion. The letter says that "that friend" (probably Kosta Jankov, the leader of the military centre in the CK of the Bulgarian Communist Party, BCP) showed interest about "the opinions about the Manifesto" among the members of IMRO; whether the signatures under it were real; whether it was already discussed on meetings; and whether it was true that Aleksandur Protogerov said during a meeting that "we can get along with the Bolsheviks (the Russian Communists) but with our own Communists - never".
Todor Aleksandrov had added to the letter: "It can be said that the signatures and not real, but if the Soviets abandon their plans for an uprising in Bulgaria, IMRO would support them for revolutions in Greece and Serbia". To the question of the "friend" whether IMRO bands would penetrate in Greek Macedonia around 15 August, Todor Aleksandrov answered negatively. And to the question "who ordered the stopping of the newspaper "Ilinden" after it published the Manifesto" Aleksandrov put just a question mark. After that Aleksandrov lends support for an eventual punitive action of IMRO bands against the Greek authorities after their pogrom again the inhabitants of the village of Turlis. This question was not finally settled, however. From the letter Todor Aleksandrov also learned about the published by the BCP appeal for a united front and about the distribution of a booklet of Dimo hadzhi Dimov and of his newspaper "People's unity". Aleksandrov took a note of these event and ordered they to be checked and established in details.
Another letter of his to Aleksandur Protogerov from 10 August sheds more light about the situation at the beginning of August 1924. Aleksandrov informed about his talks with P. Acev and G. Zankov, that he reminded them about the decision of the CK of IMRO for the immediate exclusion of Arseni Jovkov from the leadership of the Ilinden organisation and that Zankov had to write a declaration that he will be "paying attention" in his activities. Zankov also had to admit in his own writing his past "mistakes" in connection with the congress of Ilinden in Plovdiv and "to repent". With this letter Aleksandrov again calls P. Acev to come to talk with him. He also reports that "these days/very soon" he will issue a memorandum "in case of new mutinies by BCP in the Petrich district", in which he would elucidate the stance of IMRO. Aleksandrov also sent one more copy of the memorandum No 711 to the "unbelieving Thomas", in order to see the signatures and the stamp.
In the letter to Protogerov Aleksandrov also comments the negotiations in Vienna and the signed documents. He says: "It is true, that this dark chapter in the IMRO activity - the Manifesto, the declaration, etc. has not yet finished." He expresses disagreement with the "parting away" of "Sabri" (a pseudonym). It was a high time according to Aleksandrov for him "to go to a spa", in order "to introduce order in the ranks". Further in the letter Aleksandrov thinks that the general congress must take place at the end of the year - in the winter at the latest; he thinks that they would "definitely" have a "majority" there.
Todor Aleksandrov also expressed his opinion about the renegades Stojan Mishev (the father-in-law of the future president of RoM Kiro Gligorov, who embezzled IMRO money and entered into collaboration with the Serbians), Sukudzharo, etc. and how to deal with them. He thought that a small band consisting of 10-12 people have to be send again them and to defeat their bands. In a note to the letter he wrote that it would be recommendable if G. Zankov was sent against them so that he "would be more readily deflected" from his current incorrect course.
On 17 August Aleksandrov was visited by Ivan Mihajlov, Naum Tomalevski and Pero Shandanov, together with the French military attache arrived from Sofia. In the talk with them Aleksandrov said that he was not informed about the final version of the Manifesto and that he found it to be "too extreme". He also pointed out that had he not signed the Vienna agreements by a proxy, there would have happened a complete split in his organisation. That the organisation could not be preserved in its present form. A word was open about the need of contacts with the BCP and of telling them that, in view that the Manifesto and the declaration were not warmly met by the Macedonian revolutionaries and the Macedonian refugees, the CK of the IMRO thought their publication was too hasty. I value your signatures, said Todor Aleksandrov, and this must be immediately said to Vienna; that efforts should be laid not to stir up the problem until the IMRO congress, where three of the members of the Central Committee would try with the authority they command to ensure the adoption of the signed in Vienna documents, although with certain corrections.
In the same evening Todor Aleksandrov signed the prepared by Naum Tomalevski text of one refutation. The next day it appeared on the first pages of the press. At that time Aleksandrov also met in Kjustendil with Nemanov, the correspondent of "Times" and "Tan". The correspondent informed him that London and Paris were in panic after the publication in "Federation Balcanique" and that if it turned out that the documents were indeed signed by Aleksandrov, Protogerov, and Chaulev, the Macedonian cause would definitely collapse.
On 25 August Todor Aleksandrov received Jordan Gjurkov who was given explanations about the conduct in the Vienna negotiations and the signed documents. He also met separately with P. Acev and Kosta Jankov. The latter - following his own request. Acev was criticised by Aleksandrov about the selection of G. Zankov and Arseni Jovkov in the leadership of the Ilinden organisation. Aleksandrov stressed that this way the leadership of the organisation had been disowned and he required their removal until the passions subsided or "other measures" could be taken.
Kosta Jankov was informed that the published by him and Protogerov declaration-refutation was caused by the confusion the Vienna documents created in the leadership of IMRO, among its members and the emigration as a whole. The CK of IMRO was still true to its signatures before the Vienna documents and they insisted the BCP to inform Vienna quickly about this. Kosta Jankov praised the "left" leaning of IMRO as a big success for the progressive movement in Bulgaria and in the Balkans and promised to send forthwith a special courier to Vienna and even to look for assistance from Moscow.
In the same evening Todor Aleksandrov discussed the situation and his talks with P. Acev and K. Jankov with Pero Shandanov. He pointed out that he was very pleased by his talk with Jankov as the latter had a correct understanding about the role of IMRO in the public and political life of Bulgaria and the Balkans. Later the talk focused over the situation in IMRO. Todor Aleksandrov worriedly pointed out that "we are not well" as the seeds of decay have taken root in it as well as in the emigration. He explained his view about the need for speedy convention of the IMRO congress because of the decay among its eminent leaders. His relation with Aleko Vassilev and Georgi Atanasov were on the verge of a rupture. It looked as if "the general (i.e. Protogerov) let himself to be led by them" as well. The relations between some voevodas in the Skopje revolutionary region - Ivan Burljo and Pancho Mihajlov, were poor, they were watching for each other's movements and every moment something incorrigible could happen. Aleksandrov was sure that the congress would "bring a respect among the dissenters".
Later Todor Aleksandrov commented on the split in the Ilinden organisation. A "complete cleansing" of it as well as of IMRO and the emigrant organisations, was necessary. Aleksandrov was on the opinion that these problems should be addressed by an special court of the organisation which he proposed to be headed by Pero Shandanov, with members Jordan Gjurkov and Ivan Mihajlov. The court should review the behaviour of Zankov and Jovkov and issued more like a "moral" judgement upon them.
Aleko Vassilev and Georgi Atanasov were also considered during the conversation to be brought before a organisation court because of their corrupting influence in IMRO. Aleksandrov had collected numerous evidence against them. He even hinted that there was a conspiracy against him. That is why he ordered the organisation court to consist of Pero Shandanov, Pancho Mihajlov and Ivan Mihajlov.
In the same day Todor Aleksandrov together with the Kjustendil voevoda Angel Uzunov prepared a memorandum ordering the local leaders along the border and in the interior as well as those in Pirin Macedonia to be ready to react against the mutiny prepared by the Communists for the beginning of September. Aleksandrov commented that in view of the situation in IMRO and its relations "with the Soviets" it was not good if the BCP took the power in Bulgaria. He wrote a letter to "Pando" and "Petjofi" (pseudonyms) informing them that "somebody" asked for a second meeting with him (probably Kosta Jankov). He wanted to facilitate "the quicker and with fewer casualties liberation of Macedonia" and to inform him that it was not about foolery (having in mind the prepared armed uprising). Aleksandrov advised them to meet and to hear what his people have to say.
On 26 August Aleksandrov left for Sofia. In a letter he proposed to Pero Shandanov to come towards the end of the month to Kjustendil. Pero indeed returned to Kjustendil on 28 August and learned that Todor will come on 1 or 2 September. In reality on 29 August 1924 Todor Aleksandrov and Aleksandur Protogerov departed from Sofia to the congress of the Sjar revolutionary region. On the next day they were in Gorna Dzhumaja where the chetnik Pando Zafirov joined them as a bodyguard. On 31 August they arrived in the Melnik district and set out for the village of Sklave, accompanied by Dincho Vretenarov and Shterjo Vlahov, the latter two send to guide them to the village of Lopovo where the congress was to take place. On their way, when they stopped for a rest and a breakfast, Vretenarov and Vlahov fired their sinister shots. This killing gave rise to a grave and fatal split and bloody fratricide in IMRO. It was followed by the Gorna Dzhumaja events, the killings of Dimo hadzhi Dimov, Aleksandur Bujnov, Chudomir Kandardzhiev and many others, which brought nothing good to the organisation, the liberation struggle and Bulgaria.
